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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

In the Matter of the Estate of

)

JOH!N W. BAUM,

(

CASE
NO. 8422

Deceased. )

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This appeal is taken by George Baum and Oliver Baum
(hereinafter referred to as appellants) from the order made
by the Honorable R. L. Tuckett, Judge of the District Court
of Utah County, sustaining objections to the admission of
evidence in support of their petition for construction of will
and determination of their interest in testator's estate, and
dismissing the said petition (R. 33).
On May 8, 1954, testator died in Provo City, Utah
County, State of Utah. Shortly thereafter his will was admitted to probate in the District Court of Utah County
(R. 9).
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Testator was survived by his six children, Vadis B.
McOmber, Ora B. Nielson, George Baum, Murray Baum,
Newell Baum, and Oliver Baum, all of whom were mentioned in testator's will (R. 10). On May 28, 1954, the testator's will was duly admitted to probate and letters of administration with will annexed were issued (R. 8, 9). On
December 10, 1954, the Administrator filed a Petition for
Partial Distribution of testator's estate to some of the devisees and legatees named in the will but excluding appellants (R. 15). On January 13, 1955, the appellants herein
filed their objection to the Petition for Partial Distribution
and in connection therewith their Petition for Construction
of Will and Determination of Petitioners' Interest in Estate
of Testator (R. 18). After an answer was filed to the petition for construction of will, a hearing was had thereon
(R. 28, 31). At the hearing, appellant Oliver Baum was
called and sworn as a witness and offered to give evidence
in support of the allegations of the petition for construction of testator's will (R. 31). Thereupon the Administrator
objected to the introduction of this evidence on grounds that
the evidence varied the provisions of the will (R. 31). After
taking the objection under advisement the court made an
order sustaining the objection of the Administrator and
dismissing the petition of appellants (R. 33).
Appellants' petition alleged the following facts which
are admitted by the court's ruling herein complained of (R.
18):
In 1922 and prior thereto, John W. Baum, (hereinafter
referred to as testator) owned and operated several fanns
in the vicinity of Ashton, Idaho. At that time and prior
thereto two of his sons, the appellants, worked for the testator in the operation of the aforesaid farms. In 1922 the
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testator became financially involved. All of his farms were
heavily mortgaged, and his wife was about to commence
divorce proceedings against him. In 1923 the testator asked
the appellants to take over and operate all of his Idaho properties. It was then agreed between testator and appellants
that if they would take the farms, operate them, pay off all
mortgage obligations, and taxes, they were to each receive
as consideration for their work one farm. Pursuant to this
agreement in 1923 the testator transferred all his farm
properties in the Ashton, Idaho, vicinity to appellants. They
operated these properties from 1923 to 1927. With the proceeds obtained from their working testator's property and
property they had leased from others during that period,
appellants paid off all the mortgages on testator's property,
both principal and interest; paid all the delinquent taxes
beginning with the year 1921 and all taxes assessed against
the property through 1927; paid out $5,000.00 on notes
which the testator had co-signed with other of his children;
and paid over $6,000.00 in cash directly to the testator. The
total amount of payments made on the testator'-s property,
to him directly, and on notes he had signed, exceeded $30,000.00 in that period.
In 1927, appellants conveyed back to the testator his
farm property in the Ashton, Idaho, vicinity. Appellants
each retained one farm, of the value at that time of about
$8,000.00 each.
In 1928 appellants entered into a contract of sale with
the testator for the purchase of one of the tracts of land
they had conveyed back to him in 1927. The total purchase
price of $22,000.00 was paid for same in full to the testator
in 1929 by appelants. The purchase price was paid by them
by their borrowing money and mortgaging their property.
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In 1928 when the aforesaid property was purchased by
appelLants, the testator claimed that $3,250.00 was still owed
to him by appellants for certain obligations still existing
against the property they had conveyed back to him in 1927.
Thereupon the testator as party of the first part and appellants as parties of the second part entered into a release and
discharge agreement whereby appellants and testator released and discharged any and all claims existing between
them in consideration for appellants' payment of the $3,250.00.
Since 1928 there have been no commercial transactions
between testator and appellants. Since then there have been
no advancements of money, real or personal property, or
property of any kind whatsoever from testator to them.
Since 1922 and up to the time of the testator's decease, the
relationship between testator and appellants has been cordial, friendly, and characterized by filial love and respect.
The issue to be decided on this appeal is whether the
trial court erred in excluding the proferred extrinsic evidence by holding that testator's will is unambiguous, definite and certain.
The following points substantiate appellants' contention that the trial court erred in so holding, and that testator's will is ambiguous and his intention unclear.
STATEl\'IENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM WAS UNAMBIGUOUS, DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND THAT IT WAS TESTATOR'S INTENTION TO CUT OFF GEORGE BAUM AND
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OLIVER BAUM WITH ONE DOLLAR EACH AND NO
MORE. THE WILL IS AMBIGUOUS AND TESTATOR'S
INTENT UNCLEAR AS SHOWN BY THIE PROVISIONS
THEREOF.
POINT TWO
THE PROFERRED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE PETITION OF APPELLANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL IS ADMISSIBLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES THEREIN.
THE ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN FIN/DING THAT THE
WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM WAS UNAMBIGUOUS, DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND THAT IT WAS TESTATOR'S INTENTION TO CUT OFF GEORGE BAUM AND
OLIVER BAUM WITH ONE DOLLAR EACH AND NO
MORE. THE WILL IS AMBIGUOUS AND TESTATOR'S
INTENT UNCLEAR AS SHOWN BY TH!E PROVISIONS
THEREOF.
By the following portion of testator's will his intention
to treat all of his children alike in the disposition of his
property is clearly shown:
XI

"It is also my wish and desire that my aforesaid
children accept the provisions of this, my Last Will
and Testament in the spirit in which I have made them.
It is my desire to treat all my children alike in the disposition of my property and the aforesaid provisions,
accomplish this result in as fair and equal a manner as
could be done. I direct and request that the affairs of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

my estate shall be settled up in a peaceable and in an·
appreciative manner."
But, by the following provisions of the testator's will aPpellants were each bequeathed One Dollar and no more:

IV
"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son,
Oliver Baum, the sum of One !Dollar ($1.00) and no
more, he having heretofore received in real property
his full share of my estate."

v
"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son,
George Baum, the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no
more, he having heretofore received in real property
. his full share of my estate."
,

,, T•

-:-~

Paragraph II of testator's will contains the followillg
recital :
"I have already advanced money and property to
my sons, George Baum and Oliver Baum which is equivalent to their full share in my estate."
Paragraph III of testator's will provides as follows:
III
"I hereby direct and order that my land, money,
or other property advanced or settled by me in my lifetime which I have mentioned in the last preceding paragraph, to or for the benefit of any child of mine, shall
be full satisfaction to such child, unless I shall have
otherwise declared by writing under my hand."
It is in reference to the above provisions of the testator's will that ambiguities arise. The language used in these

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

provisions leaves doubt as to whether testator intended that
appellants be cut off from participation in testator's estate;
whether advancements made to any child of his should be
considered in determining their share in his estate; whether
any advancement made, aside from the amount thereof,
was to be considered a full share·; whether testator had
made what in law amounts to an advancement to appellants;
and whether testator desired that any writing of his be used
in determining whether appellants were to be left One Dollar and no more.
The above provisions of testator's will must be construed and interpreted in the light of testator's declaration
contained in paragraph XI of his will. Therein testator declared: "It is my desire to treat all of my children alike
in the disposition of my property . . .". In light of this
provision, testator's bequest to appellants of One Dollar each
in paragraphs IV and V raises serious doubt as to whether
testator intended to accord like treatment to his children,
or whether he intended to exclude appellants from any partici~ation in the distribution of his property.
In paragraph II of the will testator declares that he had
already advanced "money" and "property" to the appellants. In paragraph III thereof he refers to the property
mentioned in paragraph II and directs that his "land, money,
or other property", so settled by him in his lifetime, "to or
for the benefit of any child of (his), shall be full satisfaction to such child, unless (he) shall have otherwise declared
by writing under (his) hand." This provision sharply qualifies the advances made by testator in his lifetime which
"shall be full satisfaction to such child", to advances, "to or
for the benefit of any child of mine". This raises the question as to whether any advances have been made by testator
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to or for the benefit of any child of his, particularly appellants. But by the final phrase of this paragraph testator
says that such advances shall be "full satisfaction" to the
child receiving same "unless I shall have otherwise declared by writing under my hand." The paragraph indicates that the testator had doubts in his mind as to:
(1)
dren?

What advances, if any, he had made to his chil-

(2) As to which children advances had been made
by him?
(3) What, if any, declarations in writing under his
hand he had made with respect to such advances?
Thus the provisions of paragraphs IT and m create an
ambiguity as to the intended effect of the advances, andreflects the testator's doubts as to whether prior writings
may not show that no advancements had been made.
By paragraphs IV and V the testator cuts off his sons
Oliver Baum and George Baum with One Dollar, basing his
action in each case on the declaration "he having heretofore received in real property his full share of my estate."
Here again doubt and ambiguity appears from the testator's
language. In paragraph II he declared the advances to appellants to be "money and property". In paragraph m he
declares same to be "land, money or other property". But
in paragraphs IV and V testator limits the advancements
to real property.
The foregoing provisions concerning advancements create ambiguities with respect thereto in the following particulars:
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(1) Did the testa tor in his lifetime make any
transfers or conveyances to George Baum and Oliver
Baum of any or either of the different kinds of property mentioned in paragraphs II, III, IV, or V which
amount to advances under the Utah law?
(2) If such transfers and conveyances testator
made amount to advancements under our law, what did
he intend with respect thereto by his declarations in
paragraph III of his will?
(a) Does the language used by the testator
herein express doubt as to what property was advanced by him to or for the benefit of which of
his children?
(b) To resolve that doubt did the testator
provide therein that such advances as he may have
made to any child of his shall be full satisfaction
"unless (he) shall have otherwise declared in writing under (his) hand"?
(3) What did the testator intend by the provision
in paragraph III "unless I shall have otherwise declared
by writing under my hand."?
(a) Does this language used mean his written and signed declarations prior to the making of
his will?
(b) Or does the language look to the future
and a time subsequent to the making of the will?
(c) Or does this language have both a retrospective and a prospective meaning?
(d) If testator has so otherwise declared,
does that satisfy his advancement declarations in
the will and result in the child or children concerned sharing equally with the others in the disposition of testator's property?
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It is to be noted that in each of the above quoted para-

graphs of testator's will reference is made to advancements,
but in no instance is any amount of money, or item of other
property identified. Also, the question arises as to why testator recited "money and property", in paragraph II, "land,
money, or other property", in paragraph III, and in paragraphs IV and V states that the advancements to appellants had been in real property. It seems a reasonable interpretation of this will that in providing therein these
things the testator desired that advancements of any kind
of property to any of his children should be considered in
determining their respective shares.
Appellants' contention that it was the testator's desire
to consider all advancements made to any of his children
in determining their share in his estate, is borne out by the
presence in paragraph III of the phrase "to or for the benefit of any child of mine". We submit that there is no other
reason for the presence of this phrase in testator's will unless for that purpose. A reading of the will up to the point
of this phrase shows exclusive reference to appellants. The
phrase broadens the scope of the application of the provisions therein on advancements to include any of testator's
children. In light of this the reading of paragraph m raises
the question of what the testator intended to result from
the fact of an advancement to any one of his six children.
It is submitted that in view of the fact that testator's
declared intention was to treat his children alike, and since
the will itself declares that advancements have been made
to appellants, the following provision of the Utah Code
clearly requires that the court must hear all evidence touching upon the question of advancements made by the testator:
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Section 75-12-9 Utah Code Annotated (1953)
"Advancements to be determined - Conclusiveness
of decree - All questions as to advancements made or
alleged to have been made by the decedent to his heirs
may be heard and determined by the court, and must
be specified in the decree assigning and distributing the
estate; and the final judgment or decree of the court
is binding on all parties interested in the estate, subject
only to be reversed, modified or set aside on appeal."
In the light of the foregoing statute the trial ,court erred
in refusing to receive or consider the proferred evidence
concerning advancements.
Appellants admit that testator could have cut them off
simply by stating that such was his desire and leaving each
one dollar. However, the testator does not do this. He
declares why he leaves one dollar bequests to appellants, his
declaration being that he had already given appellants their
share of this property. The fact that such a declaration
is made shows that testator had no ill feeling toward appellants, and that he did not want them cut off without giving them their full share of his estate.
It is the position of appellants that testator in his apparent desire to treat all of his children alike in the distribution of his estate to them, made the foregoing declarations and provisions in his will which have created serious
ambiguities that can only be 'Clarified and resolved by resorting to extrinsic evidence; that appellants' proferred extrinsic evidence would clarify the ambiguities, particularly
as concerns the rna tter of advancements and would give effect to the declared intention of testator to treat all his children alike and that the court erred in refusal to admit and
consider such proferred evidence.
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POINT TWO
THE PROFERRED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE PETITION OF APPELLANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE WILL IS ADMISSIBLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES THEREIN.

Where ambiguities exist in a will and are incapable of
being resolved by its provisions, the law is clear that resort
may be had to extrinsic evidence to aid the court in ascertaining the real intention of the testator as evidenced by
the language he used.
The above general rule in this connection is stated and
discussed by the following authorities:
69 C. J. Section1173, p. 135: " ... generally speaking,
extrinsic evidence is admissible, when necessary, both
to place the court in a knowledge of the condition and
circumstances surrounding the testator when he executed his will, and to resolve uncertainties or ambiguities in the will as to the testator's intentions; ... "
Ibid, Section 1178, pp. 144-146: "While extrinsic evi.dence is not admissible to remove a doubt or ambiguity
which may fairly be resolved by a resort to the context
of the instrument, yet where the language of a will is
doubtful or ambiguous, parol or extrinsic evidence may
be admitted for the purpose of assisting the court in
ascertaining its meaning; or as the rule is frequently
stated, when it is necessary, in order to enable the court
to ascertain the intention of the testator, parol evidence
may be admitted for the purpose of showing and explaining a latent ambiguity arising as to the identity
of the beneficiary or subject matter of the will."
4 Page on Wills (Lifetime Edition) Section 1617, pp.
626-7: "The meaning and application of the terms of
the will cannot be understood until the property and
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beneficiaries have been identified, which can be done
only by extrinsic evidence; and, in many instances, until the court understands testator's situation with reference to his property, the natural objects of his bounty, and his contemplated beneficiaries. Evidence of
this sort explains the meaning of the will; and, not infrequently, this meaning is varied to the extent that
the will evidently means something different, when read
in the light of admissible extrinsic evidence, from the
meaning which it appeared to have without such evidence. It is said that such evidence is received, not to
defeat, but to aid in determining the testator's intent
when that intent is uncertain from a reading of the
will itself, and to explain or resolve doubts, not to create them."
Ibid, Section 1618, pp. 628-30: "The question of the
admissibility of parol e·vidence, therefore, is generally
raised where the will, either upon its face, or by reason
of imperfect description of the subject-matter of the
gift or the object of the testator's bounty, is ambiguous or uncertain. It is ofted stated, as a general principle, that evidence of extrinsic circumstances is admissible to aid in interpretating a will which is ambiguous."
"While in some cases considerable stress is put on
the fact that evidence is admissible because of the ambiguity of the will, this is because it is only in such
cases that extrinsic evidence needs to be considered in
construing the will; and in any case, whether the will
appears ambiguous or not, the court is entitled to hear
such extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstances as will put it in the place of testator."
The foregoing doctrine is recognized in the State of
Utah by the case of In re Pickard's Estate (1912) 42 Utah
105, 129 P. 353. In that case the testatrix bequeathed her
property to a trustee, first to provide for a living income to
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her husband, and secondly to be equally divided between her
two children, " . . . except so far as sums have been or
shall be set off against the interests which either would be
entitled to under the provisions of this will, respectively, in
case such sums had remained a part of the assets of the
estate; the shares of my said daughter and son to be determined as of the date of my decease." Her daughter (executrix) petitioned for final distribution alleging that before
the will was made the testatrix advanced to her son the sum
of $2,750 upon the understanding that such sum was paid
out of her estate as an advancement, which should be taken
into consideration in the distribution of the estate property.
This the son denied, and the trial court refused to consider
extrinsic evidence of this fact and held that the two children
of testatrix share equally in her estate. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the evidence pertaining to advancements made by testatrix in her
lifetime should have been admitted, since the third clause
of the will intended some sort of set-off against the interests
the brother and sister would be entitled to under the will.
In this connection this court had the following to say: (pp.
110-11 Utah Report)
"We therefore look to the will to see what she did
in such particular. The respondent asserts that by the
will the two contestants were given equal proportions
without qualification of any kind in and to the residue
of such property. The appellant asserts the contrary.
We think, on the face of the will, the contention of the
respondent cannot prevail, for it is clear that the testatrix, by the language used by her, 'except so far as
sums have been or shall be set off against the interests
which either would be entitled to under the provisions of
this will', etc., intended some sort of set off against the
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respective interests of such legatees. If it be assumed
that by such language she meant and intended the sum
or sums of money paid by her to one and not to the
other, or the excess that the one had received over the
other, then was parol evidence admissible to show the
amount or amounts thereof. If on the other hand it be
assumed that such language is ambiguous and the intention of the testatrix in such particular uncertain
when tJhe whole of the will is looked to, then, again, was
parol evidence of pertinent facts and circumstances admissible to aid the ,court in ascertaining and determining
the real or actual intention of the testatrix as evidenced
by the language so used by her. And it would seem that
on the latter, and not the former, theory was such parol
evidence admissible."
In the instant case, as indicated above under Point One,
the language of tQe will has created ambiguities more extensive than did the provision in the Pickard will. If it was
error to exclude proferred clarifying extrinsi,c evidence in
that case, a fortiori, it was error for the trial court to do
so in the instant ,case. How can effect be given to testator's
declared intention to treat all his childen alike until the proferred extrinsic evidence has been received and considered
on the matter of his conflicting statements as to advancements responsible for the ambiguities which must be resolved?
As pointed out by Professor Page (4 Page on Wills,
Lifetime Edition, Section 1623) a great many courts in this
connection only allow extrinsic evidence if the ambiguity
is latent, as distinguished from i1s being patent. Appellants
submit that their proferred extrinsic evidence was admissible to sustain the allegations of their petition even under
this distinction rule. Even though the Utah Supreme Court
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has made no such distinction in cases of this character we
call attention to Professor Page's criticism of it which follows:
Ibid., pp. 654: "Accordingly, while admitting that
many excellent authorities have discussed the law of
extrinsic evidence in construction upon the basis of the
distinction between patent and latent ambiguities, it
undoubtedly would be a step in advance in the development of our law to discard the distinction entirely. No
distinction or classification, whether old or new, which
cuts across the actual distinctions which courts are
forced to make in order to do justice between litigants,
should be either accepted or retained. That the distinction is not founded upon sound principle can be seen
from the fact that even the courts which have most
frequently invoked it, regularly proceed, in deciding
cases, so to explain the distinction between the patent
and latent ambiguities as to eliminate it practically from
the discussion, and instead use the distinction between
evidence of testator's intention direct and evidence of
the surrounding facts and circumstances as the fundamental distinction to be observed."
The case of Payne vs. Todd et al, 43 P2d 1004 {1935),
illustrates the modern trend of judicial thought conce:niing
the problem before this Court. In that case the testator
declared in paragraph 4 of his will that he forgave a debt
owed him by his son, Stanley T. Payne, in the sum of approximately $3,000.00 plus accrued interest at the date of
testator's death and fw·ther provided as follows:
" ... it being my purpose to have the said debt
cancelled, if it still exists at the time of my death, and
this cancellation is made as a part of the share of my
estate which might otherwise be ,bequeathed to him,
and my said son will understand this arrangement."
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In the seventh paragraph of the will the testator left
the residue of his property in equal shares to his five children. The executor claimed that Stanley was not entitled
to share under the residuary clause and had only the right
to receive the documents evidencing the indebtedness. Stanley denied the executor's claim and offered extrinsic evidence of advancements made by testator to his children dlll'ing his lifetime, and the relationships and circumstances existing at the time they were made, in order to clear up the
ambiguities created by the language of the will. The trial
court refused to hear the evidence on the ground that the
will was clear and w1ambiguous. On appeal the Supreme
Court of Arizona held that the trial court erred in refusing
to hear the evidence proferred because the will was ambiguous and required extrinsic evidence to put the court in
the position of the testator at the time the will was made
so that a proper construction of it could be made.
The following excerpts from that case are particularly
germane to the question before this court:
"The difficulty is with clause four. By its terms
he specifically forgave to the appellant herein a debt
which originally amounted to $3,000.00. He evidently
contemplated that his son would make payments upon
the debt, but that it might not be fully paid before his
death. If clause four had stopped at the phrase 'if it
still exists at the time of my death,' there can be no
doubt that a forgiveness of the debt, in addition to participation in the residuary bequest, was intended by the
testator. The difficulty arises over the construction
of the remaining portion of the clause, which says that
the cancellation is a part of appellant's share of testator's estate 'which might otherwise be bequeathed to
him.' It is the contention of the executor that these
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last words are equivalent to 'which has been bequeathed
to him in clause seven of the will.' It is the position of
appellant that its meaning is 'which would have been,
but because of this clause has not been, bequeathed by
this will.' We are of the opinion that a plausible argument can be made, and indeed has been made in the
briefs of the respective parties, in favor of each construction suggested. Such being the case we must hold
that clause four is ambiguous in its meaning when taken in connection ·with all the remainder of the will.
"The question then is, is this ambiguity of such a
nature that parol evidence is admitted, not to vary or
contradict the terms of the will, but to explain the
meaning of the testator when he used the words which
he did? A good deal of the time is devoted in the briefs
to a discussion of the difference between a patent and
a latent ambiguity and the rules applying thereto. The
older decisions tend to hold that it is only latent ambiguities which may be explained by parol evidence.
The more modern cases seem to take the view that any
ambiguity which may be cleared up by a showing of
the circumstances surrounding the testator at the tim~
he made his will is susceptible of explanation by parol
evidence."
After discussing two prior decisions the court concludes:
"We think, following the rules laid down in these
two cases, that parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of explaining either a patent or latent ambiguity
in the will, but that it can only go to the extent of showing the circumstances surrounding the testator at the
time he made the will, such as previous advancements
to his children, his desire in regard to an equalization
of bequests, the character and value of the property
disposed of by the will, and similar matters.''
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Upon the record before this Court, and based upon the
foregoing appliooble law, the conclusion is clear that the
trial court erred in refusing to admit the proferred evidence,
and in dismissing the petition of George Baum and Oliver
Batun.
CONCLUSION

vVe conclude that paragraphs II, III, IV and V of testator's wlll, when read in reference to paragraph XI thereof, create serious ambiguities as to what the testator intended for his two sons, George Baum and Oliver Baum; also
as to what he intended with respect to all advancements
he made to any or all of his children; and that it would be
impossible to give effect to testator's declared intention to
treat all of his children alike without resorting to extrinsic
evidence to explain these advancement provisions of his will.
Appellants contend that reading the will in the light
of the facts alleged in their petition warrants the conclusion that it was the intention of testator to treat all of his
children alike in the disposition of his property at his death.
To achieve this result the testator naturally referred in his
will to his two sons (appellants) with whom he had had the
most to do in connection with his property in his lifetime.
Since he no doubt realized that his dealings with them had
been complicated and had been long since terminated, it is
apparent that he did not remember the full significance of
what had transpired between them. He undoubtedly felt
that in fairness to the rest of his children those transactions
should be considered at the time his estate was settled, so
that any property of his that appellants had received without paying any consideration for, in return should be
charged against their share of his estate. Also in fairness
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to appellants he made provision that if testator either had
not given them their share in advancements, or had "otherwise declared in writing" concerning advancements, then appellants would be treated "alike" and share equally with the
other children. He also realized that he had had other transactions with other children and therefore intended that
they be considered at the time the estate was to be distributed. Since the testator wanted to treat the children "alike"
his reference, without identification, to advanceme~ts made,
clearly shows that what he intended to be accomplished was
that when the estate was settled all advancements which he
had made in his lifetime to any or either of his six children
should be off-set against the respective one-sixth interest
of each child.
It is submitted that if the foregoing construction is not
adopted the children of testator will not have been accorded .
like treatment.
Respectfully submitted,
BALLIF & BALLIF
George S. Ballif
George E. Ballif
Attorneys for Appellants
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